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1. Preliminaries 
There are many ways to classify properties. For example, Locke's 
division between primary and secondary qualities is widely known. 
Another possible classification that can be found in philosophical 
literature is between necessary (or essential) and accidentally 
properties, as well as between intrinsic and external ones. There 
are, however, a number of cases, when the question, whether a 
property is necessary (essential) or accidental (nonessential) to an 
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object, is simply premature. The classical examples are those of 
Caesar or of the moon, if one asks:  
 (1) Is Caesar prime (a prime number)?  
 (2) Is the moon honest?  
 I propose to explain such cases in terms of relevance-
irrelevance. It is clear that the property "prime" has nothing to do 
with Caesar, i.e., it is irrelevant to him. And so is the property 
"honest" to the moon. The property "prime", however, is relevant to 
any natural number (no matter whether a certain number is prime 
or not). And so is the property "honest" to every human being.  
 Let us divide all the properties (with respect to some object) on 
such that are relevant to the object, and such that are irrelevant to 
it. Considering the properties that are relevant to an object, we 
may notice that the object instantiates some of them and does not 
instantiate others. As to irrelevant properties, the situation is quite 
different -it is impossible to imagine that the object has any of 
these properties at all: it simply cannot instantiate such properties. 
Thus, the following conjecture looks quite natural:  
(RP) An object can instantiate a property iff the property is rele-
vant to the object. 
 It can be shown that many paradoxes known in philosophy of 
science and semantics of natural language arise from an attempt 
to ascribe an irrelevant property to an object. The present paper is 
a part of a general project devoted to the phenomenon of rele-
vance with respect to properties. The aim of the whole project is to 
develop a formal theory of properties that takes (RP) as one of the 
main principles governing predication, and to explicate on this way 
our natural language intuitions on the relevance of properties to 
objects. The theory may have various applications: in solving logi-
cal and semantical paradoxes, in elucidating the relations between 
particulars and universals, in argumentation theory, etc. In this pa-
per we present general reflections on the subject and propose 
some key definitions. The applications will be developed in further 
papers.  
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2. Dunn on relevant predication. Relevant predication vs. relevant 
properties 
Dunn (1987) proposes a formal theory of relevant predication (re-
produced with small changes in (Anderson, Belnap and Dunn 
1992, pp. 445-472). He considers the difference between predicat-
ing a property of "being such an x that Socrates is wise" to Socra-
tes himself and ascribing it to Alcibiades. As a result, one obtains 
the following two propositions:  
 (3) Socrates is such that he is wise. 
 (4) Alcibiades is such that Socrates is wise. 
 Whereas the case (3) represents quite a "normal" (relevant) 
predication, (4) -Dunn states- is a glaring example of an "irrelevant 
predication".  
 Dunn's analysis essentially rests on some principal notions of λ-
calculus. Using lambda abstraction, any formula Fx can be trans-
formed into a predicate λxFx that represents "the property of being 
(an x such that x is) F". Dunn also makes use of the principle of β-
conversion:  
 (β) (λxFx)a ⇔ Fa. 
 Let a stand for Socrates and F stand for the property "wise". 
Then λxFx means the property of being an x such that x is wise, 
and (λxFx)a means Socrates is such that he is wise.  
 In general, however, lambda-abstraction can be applied even to 
formulas which do not contain free occurrences of x. The corre-
sponding lambda-expression is λxA (where A is a sentence) that 
represents "the property ascribed to x is saying that A". As a result 
of applying β-conversion to closed formulas one obtains the for-
mula itself:  
 (β') (λxA)a ⇔ A. 
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 Now let a stand for Alcibiades and A stand for the sentence 
"Socrates is wise". Then (λxA)a means simply Alcibiades is such 
that Socrates is wise.  
 Dunn remarks that classical lambda calculus gives no means 
for distinguishing between (3) and (4). Moreover, he shows that 
validity of (4) essentially depends on the so-called Positive Para-
dox of Relevance:  
 (PP) A 6 B → A,  
whereas the validity of (3) does not. Indeed, there is a strict anal-
ogy between (3) and (4) and the following statements:  
 (3') If anyone is Socrates, then it is wise.  
 (4') If anyone is Alcibiades, then Socrates is wise.  
 We obtain (3') by means of the following argument:  
 (3'') Socrates is wise. Therefore, if x = Socrates, then x is wise,  
which is a simple instance of Indiscernability of Identicals:  
 (II) Fa 6 x=a → Fx.  
 But the corresponding argument for (4') is a clear instance of 
(PP):  
(4'') Socrates is wise. Therefore, if x=Alcibiades, then Socrates 
is wise.  
 Dunn points out that an attempt to distinguish between (3) and 
(4) by means of a restriction saying that formation of a lambda ex-
pression λxA is allowed only when A actually has at least one free 
occurrence of the variable x fails, because of equivalencies such 
as:  
 (&1) A ⇔ A & (Fx ∨ ~Fx),  
 (&2) A ⇔ A & (A ∨ Fx).  
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 Dunn concludes that we need a special definition of relevant 
predication. He considers the famous statement of Juliet (or 
Shakespeare):  
 (5) "A rose by any other name would smell as sweet",  
and qualifies "sweet smell" as a relevant property of a rose. Taking 
(5) as a paradigmatic case of relevant predication, he proposes 
the following definition:  
Definition 1. (ρxAx)a ⇔ ∀x (x=a → Ax). (The expression 
"(ρxAx)a" is read as "a relevantly has the property of being 
(an x) such that A".)  
 This definition works quite well in many cases. However, the 
notion of the relevance that it produces is not the notion we are 
looking for, and it does not reflect the intuition outlined in the pre-
liminary section. This definition cannot reflect all the cases when a 
property could be relevant to an object. For example, one of the 
consequences of definition 1 is that if a property holds relevantly of 
an individual, then it also just plain holds of the individual (see fact 
2 from Dunn 1987). But we are prone to say that a property can be 
relevant to an individual without holding of it. What Dunn's defini-
tion really defines, we believe, is the "non-fictional" (or real) predi-
cation. This is a very useful and heuristically valuable notion, but 
we still need to find a suitable definition that could explain us what 
does it mean that a property is relevant to an object. The differ-
ence we wish to explicate is the difference between relevant predi-
cation and the relevance of properties. Moreover, as will be shown 
below, there are contexts, where the property of being such (an x) 
that Socrates is wise can be considered as relevant to Alcibiades. 
The above definition does not allow to explain such contexts as 
well.  
 Dunn introduces also the notion "ϕx is a formula of a kind that 
determines relevant properties (with respect to x)" as follows:  
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Definition 2. "ϕx is a formula of a kind that determines relevant 
properties (with respect to x)" ⇔ ∀x (ϕx → ∀y (y=x → ϕy)), 
where y is not free in ϕ. 
 This definition also does not give us an idea of the relevance 
that we wish to obtain. We expect to have a definition that can tell 
us when a property is relevant to a concrete individual. If we con-
sider a particular instance of the right-hand side of the definition 2:  
 Fa → ∀y (y=a → Fy),  
we may notice that it says us something about a relation between 
F and a, when a instantiates F, but it does not say us anything, if a 
does not instantiates F. This is rather a definition of some sort of 
strict occurrence of a variable x in the formula ϕx, and Dunn in-
deed considers in his paper such an interpretation of the definition 
2. But the problem of relevance of a property to an object still has 
to be solved.  
3. The ways of speaking about properties  
To begin with it is appropriate to make some remarks about certain 
important principles of the further analysis. The "canonical" way of 
representing properties within various theories of properties (such 
as in Feferman 1984, Turner 1987, Bealer and Mönich 1989, 
Kamareddine 1992) is to use λ-operator and (β)-conversion (or 
their analogues). Nevertheless, this apparatus taken unrestrictedly 
can produce some unwelcome consequences. As is very well-
known, (β) together with simple logical principles easily leads to a 
contradiction (Russell's paradox). Let us define F as λx.~xx. Then 
we have:  
 1. (λx.~xx)F ⇔ ~FF      (β) 
 2. FF ⇔ (λx.~xx)F      (definition of F) 
 3. FF ⇔ ~FF        (1, 2) 
 As Kamareddine (1992, pp. 79-80) points out, there are two 
main elimination strategies for Russell's paradox that are repre-
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sented by two different routs of research. In line with the first strat-
egy one proceeds from the assumption that the contradiction is 
caused by the principle of self-application. Therefore, one can 
avoid the paradox, by introducing a typed theory of some sort. The 
point of any typed theory consists in restricting just the above men-
tioned principle. Russell himself was the first who proposed to re-
solve the paradox on this way -by means of the typed set-theory. 
The typed λ-calculus also belongs to this rout of research. This 
approach, however, is not very popular, as typed theories are quite 
cumbrous and inconvenient to use.  
 Therefore, the second strategy could seem to be more attrac-
tive (as many authors believe), according to which one restricts 
logic, but keeps type-freenes and saves the principle of self-
application. In case of properties this means an acceptance of a 
general principle of self-predication. This principle constitutes an 
important desideratum of many property theories. As Chierchia 
and Turner put it:  
(SP) "Properties can be truly predicated of themselves" (Chier-
chia and Turner 1988, p. 263).  
 Oliver expresses the same idea on a "metaphysical" level:  
Particulars have or instantiate properties but not vice versa. Properties 
may themselves have or instantiate properties, but do not have or instan-
tiate particulars (Oliver 1996, p. 20).  
 Nevertheless, the above mentioned strategies are not the only 
possible ones. For example Wessel (1995) presents a theory of 
terms, where a strong division between subject terms and predi-
cate terms is realized. Subject terms should denote objects, and 
predicate terms serve for expressing properties and relations. One 
of the main principles of the theory is  
(TT) "No subject term is a predicate term, and no predicate term 
is a subject term" (Wessel 1995, p. 356).  
 On the one hand, this principle entirely locks out Russell's para-
dox. On the other hand, we still need some tools to be able to 
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state something about properties themselves. Consider the follow-
ing examples:  
 (6) Socrates is wise.  
 (7) Socrates is such that he is wise.  
 (8) The property "wise" (the property of wisdom) is worthy of 
respect.  
 Statements (6) and (7) express essentially the same idea, al-
though by different language means. The case (8) is of completely 
another character. The point is that whereas in (6) and (7) a prop-
erty ("wise") takes a predicate position, in (8) the same property 
plays the role of a subject. It can seem that (8) is incompatible with 
(TT). However, it is possible to save and explicate both -(TT) and 
(8)- by means of introducing some term-building operators (cf. also 
Scheffler 1998).  
 The language we use contains individual variables, singular 
subject terms and predicate terms as primitive symbols. Wessel 
introduces also general subject terms as a special syntactic cate-
gory as opposed to the "real" predicate terms. Such a distinction 
can be of great importance for some purposes of logical analysis 
of natural language. However, in the theory developed in the pre-
sent paper it is not essential, so we do not introduce special gen-
eral (subject) terms in our language.  
 Use x, y, z, x1,... to range over individual variables; a, b, c, a1,... 
to range over singular subject terms and P, Q, R, P1,... to range 
over predicate terms. A general presupposition is that all the terms 
are non-empty. Another important principle that we adopt in our 
theory is (TT). Predicate terms can be ascribed (applied) to subject 
terms to get sentences. Sometimes we will use a "traditional" nota-
tion with brackets -P(a), and sometimes the brackets will be omit-
ted. We have also usual quantifiers and Boolean conjunction, dis-
junction and negation. The connection of implication will play an 
important role in our theory (as it usually does in many theories). 
Thus, we will need a "real" implication to avoid very well-known 
difficulties and paradoxes of material implication (especially those 
that are connected with fallacies of relevance -it would be of 
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course highly unwelcome to have these fallacies in a theory that 
claims to explain the phenomenon of relevant properties). As the 
theory of relevant implication seems to be the most carefully 
elaborated theory among modern theories of "non-paradoxical" 
implication, we (following Dunn) employ the system of relevance 
logic RQ with identity. This adds the connective of relevant impli-
cation → to our language.  
 If Ax is a language expression having (perhaps) free occur-
rences of x, then x.Ax is a term (to be read as "an x such that Ax"). 
Let us introduce also two term-forming operators: [ ] -for creating 
predicate terms from subject terms, and π -for creating subject 
terms from predicate terms. The rules are as follows:  
 (PT) If x.Ax is a subject term, then [x.Ax] is a predicate term.  
 (ST) If P is a predicate term, then πP is a subject term.  
 The reading for [x.Ax] is -"the property of being (an x such that x 
is) A", and for πP- "the property P". That is, having one and the 
same property, we distinct two modes of speech about it. One 
should notice, that a property, beeing expressing in the form πP, 
can be used only in subject position, and this is the only possibility 
to put it in this position. 
 Now let a stand for Socrates, W -for "wise" and R- for "worthy of 
respect". Then formalizations for (6)-(8) are as follows:  
 (6') Wa  
 (7') [x.Wx]  
 (8') R(πW)  
 It is easy to see that now Russell's paradox cannot even be 
formulated, because FF is simply not well-formed expression of 
the language. However, our theory (as well as the one of Wes-
sel's) is not a real (full) typed theory, because we do not introduce 
types for each level of language expressions. The only thing we do 
-we strongly distinguish between occurrences of a property in a 
subject and in a predicate position. This solution can be consid-
ered as a restricted typed theory. It allows only two types of terms, 
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but does not involve (as usual type-theories do) types for more 
than the second level.  
 The acceptance of (TT) has some important ontological conse-
quences   -it results in a kind of hierarchical ontology. It means a 
strong ontological division between particulars and universals -no 
particular is an universal and visa versa. Thus, we take for granted 
that only particulars can instantiate properties, and do not agree 
with the above statement of Oliver. On the contrary, we believe 
that properties cannot really instantiate properties. It does not 
mean, however, that statements like (8) are illegal. We have to 
distinguish between what is going on in our language and in real-
ity. There is no one-to-one correspondence between the (non-
linguistic) world and the language: the latter is more complex. This 
complexity is introduced by people. People often handle some 
phenomena -which originally are not things at all-, as if they were a 
sort of things: the objects of their consideration. This happens, 
e.g., when we consider properties, we transform them in some 
kind of "objects" and obtain thereby a possibility to characterize 
them in that or another way. However, after a property becomes 
an object of our consideration, it does not become a real particular 
(or individual)! The formal apparatus outlined above makes it pos-
sible to combine the ontological rigor with the flexibility of our lan-
guage -we can speak about properties in the "subject mode" with-
out any commitment to regard them as real particulars.  
4. Negative predication 
A special type of predication plays a key role in our theory, namely 
the negative one, that can be introduced side by side with ordinary 
(positive) predication. As Fuhrman (1998) points out, it was a long 
tradition in logic to distinguish between negation of a sentence and 
negation of a predicate. This tradition seems to be almost forgot-
ten (as we believe -undeservedly) in many of current logical works. 
This is all the more strange as one of the founders of the modern 
symbolic logic, Charles Peirce, in his article for the Baldwin's Dic-
tionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902) clearly distinguished 
between negation "as denying the proposition" and negation "as 
denying the predicate". Some modern authors also use the differ-
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ence between these two kinds of negation, as, e.g. Routley (1980), 
"exploring Meinongs's jungle", does. R. Turner (1987) also em-
ploys "two negations which are both classical but are not interde-
finable" (Turner 1987, p. 459). He points out that "internal negation 
of properties is not always equivalent to sentential negation" and 
would like to "institutionalize this by introducing 'negative' predica-
tion relations" (ibid.).  
 In the 60-70th Sinowjew and Wessel carefully elaborated and 
axiomatized a special predication theory that deals with both types 
of predication (see, e.g., Wessel 1998). They called it the non-
traditional theory of predication. The crux of the negative predica-
tion consists in that it expresses a special type of relation, namely 
the denying ("absprechen") relation between predicate and sub-
ject, as opposed to a statement that it is not the case that a predi-
cate is ascribed to an object. Thus, statements like "It is not the 
case that Socrates is wise" and "Socrates is not wise" generally 
are not equivalent. The difference may be not so evident in the 
example of Socrates, but it becomes obvious, if we compare the 
statements "It is not the case that number 2 is wise" and "Number 
2 is not wise". The first sentence is true, whereas the second one 
is false (as well as "Number 2 is wise").  
 Let us introduce a special *-operation that represent the nega-
tive predication. That is, P*a means that predicate P is "internally" 
denied of a. It is important that P*a represents a simple sentence, 
as well as Pa. P*a and ~Pa are generally not equivalent, only the 
following holds:  
 (NE) P*a → ~Pa (see Wessel 1998, p. 164).  
 (NE) is the only axiom that has to be added to predicate logic 
for axiomatizing negative predication. The analogue for the law of 
excluded middle (P*a ∨ Pa) does not hold for negative predication.  
5. Simple predicates. A generalization of properties 
At first, we confine ourselves with the simple predicates. We adopt 
the following version of (β) (which we call "the scheme of abstrac-
tion"):  
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 (AB) [x.Fx]a ↔ Fa.  
 The direction from left to the right is called Reduction, and from 
right to the left -Expansion (cf. Turner 1987, p. 459). We call a 
predicate simple iff an application of Reduction to it results in a 
simple sentence. Simple predicates stand for simple properties. 
We introduce also the following scheme of abstraction for negative 
predication (for simple predicates):  
 (NA1) [x.Fx]*a ↔ F*a.  
 It may seem that introducing negative predication presents a 
solution to the problem of relevance of properties. Let us call a 
property P determinate with respect to the object a iff it is true that 
P*a ∨ Pa. Now one may suggest that a property is relevant to an 
object iff it is determinate with respect to it. Unfortunately, this 
suggestion is wrong. Indeed, it works in some cases, as e.g. for (1) 
and other similar cases when we deal with precise properties that 
are strictly defined. Statements like (2), on the contrary, cannot be 
explicated in this way, because the property "honest" (as well as, 
e.g., "wise") is extremely vague. According to our intuition, these 
properties are relevant to all people, although for many persons it 
is entirely unclear whether they are honest or not (P*a ∨ Pa does 
not hold).  
 Nevertheless, negative predication can be very useful for intro-
ducing one crucial notion, the notion of generalization of properties 
which, in its turn, is of great importance for understanding of what 
the relevance of properties consists in. This notion cannot be in-
troduced by means of a definition like: property Q is a generaliza-
tion of the property P iff all objects that have P, have also Q. Such 
a definition is incorrect in view of so-called coextensive properties. 
For example, a couple of properties like "to be sold" -"to be 
bought" satisfies the definition, but these properties are by no 
means generalizations of each other.  
 Let P < Q be a symbolic representation of an expression "prop-
erty Q is a generalization of the property P". Then we have the 
following definition:  
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 Definition 3. P < Q ⇔ ∀x (Px ∨ P*x → Qx).  
 It is easy to see that < is transitive, i.e. if P < Q and Q < R, so P 
< R. Definition 3 shows, what is the difference between generaliza-
tion of properties and the relation of simple meaning inclusion be-
tween the corresponding predicate terms: to be a proper generali-
zation of P, Q should include not only P itself, but also its "negative 
counterpart". For example, there is a meaning inclusion between 
the terms "quadrate" and "rhomb", but a real generalization of 
"quadrate" is, of course, not "rhomb" but "geometrical figure".  
 In many cases we are interested not in any generalization of the 
given property, but in what can be called its natural generalization. 
Natural generalization of a property should represent the natural 
kind for this property. However, an attempt to define such natural 
generalization meets serious "metaphysical" difficulties.  
 Suppose that for every property there is exactly one other prop-
erty "objectively" being its natural generalization. Let P <n Q 
stands for "Q is the natural generalization of P". Then a possible 
way of defining this relation is to find the nearest generalization of 
P. That is, we may wish to consider a definition like  
 (NG) P <n Q ⇔ P < Q and ∀R (P < R and R < Q → ∀x (Rx ↔ 
Qx)).  
 This definition is quite questionable. In fact, it easy to see that in 
this case Q is always [x.Px ∨ P*x]. This is, of course, a very unwel-
come consequence of the proposed definition. Now, if we insist 
that we should consider only simple properties, it would be only a 
partial and therefore unsatisfactory solution, because generally we 
are not going to have only such a limited language which consid-
erably restricts our expressive possibilities. Moreover, this defini-
tion presupposes some strong ontological assumptions, such as: 
the structure of the world is somehow defined in advance, and for 
every property there is the nearest generalization of it. This as-
sumption is very doubtful indeed. 
 Therefore, we should give up any attempt to define the notion of 
natural generalization. This does not mean, however, that the no-
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tion itself is useless. On the contrary, in many cases it is very use-
ful to distinguish among all the generalizations of the given prop-
erty that one property which can be considered as its natural gen-
eralization. In what follows we will do it this way: having a property 
P, we take for granted that we can always label one of its generali-
zations as a "natural generalization" of P. We will mark such a 
property as Pnat.  
6. Context-free relevance of properties  
Consider the property "bald". To which objects is it relevant? First 
of all, to people -both bald and not bald. Unfortunately, this prop-
erty is vague, so that many people take an "intermediate position", 
and it is difficult to say, whether they are bald or not. However, 
everybody will agree that the property under consideration is rele-
vant to these "intermediate" people (perhaps, even more relevant 
than to other, "non-intermediate" people). And to which objects is it 
not relevant? Evidently, for chairs, tables, numbers, and all the 
objects that cannot be bald. And what about robots, or animals? 
Apparently, it would be not unnatural to admit that this property is 
relevant to them. (E.g., sometimes we say that lionesses are bald, 
as opposed to the lions.) That is, we can meaningfully consider a 
question whether this or that robot, or animal is bald or not. Why? 
Because all these objects have a head, and as such they may be 
bald! The property "bald" is relevant to these objects with respect 
to the property "to have a head". Let RelQ(πP,a) stands for "prop-
erty P is relevant to the object a relative to the property Q". Then, 
we arrive at the following definition:  
 Definition 4. RelQ(πP,a) ⇔ P < Q & ∀x (x=a → Qx).  
 The next step is to use the convention from the previous sec-
tion. Suppose we mark out some property Pnat such that P < Pnat 
as a natural generalization of P. It gives us a possibility to define 
the simple (context-free) relevance of properties to objects 
(Rel(πP,a)):  
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 Definition 5. Rel(πP,a) ⇔ ∀x (x=a → Pnatx).  
 In words: a property is relevant to an object a iff, the object in-
stantiates the natural generalization of the property (and this 
should hold for any object that could be on the place of a).  
 The above example with the property "bald" perfectly illustrates 
the definition. We may consider the property "to have a head" as a 
natural generalization of the property "bald". Thus, the property 
"bald" is relevant to any object that has a head. As another exam-
ple take the property "green". Hegel tried to ascribe this property to 
the spirit, and to show on this way an inadequacy of formal logic. 
However, it can be shown that the property "green" is irrelevant to 
such object as spirit, and as such cannot be ascribed to it. Indeed, 
the natural generalization for "green" is "colored" (in the sense "to 
have a color"), and spirits have no color at all.  
 Definition 4 correlates to Dunn's definition of relevant predica-
tion, but it has an essential distinctive feature. It gives a possibility 
to explicate such cases as (1) and (2), whereas Dunn's definition 
does not. (In fact, Dunn does not aim at the analysis of this sort of 
predication, his goal is more narrow -to rule out predications like 
(4).)  
 This definition gives us the context-free relevance, because we 
do not take into consideration any additional context. Below we will 
consider the role of context and introduce the notion of relevance 
that allows to analyze the contexts where the property of "being 
such an x that Socrates is wise" can be relevant to Alcibiades.  
7. Complex predicates: a general case  
Before we come over to context-dependent relevance of proper-
ties, we have to extend the definitions above on complex predi-
cates. The main problem consists in the negative predication -what 
should be the scheme of abstraction in this case? We have to take 
into account that the "star"-operator can be applied only to simple 
predicates. Thus, we need special rules for "importation" the star 
into complex predicates.  
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Definition 6. If X is any formula of the language, then (X)' is the 
negative reflection of X which is constructed in accordance 
with the following conditions:  
(a) (Px)' = P*x; 
(b) (P*x)' = Px; 
(c) (A & B)' = (A)' ∨ (B)';  
(d) (A ∨ B)' = (A)' & (B)';  
(e) (~A)' = ~(A)';  
(f) (∀xA)' = ∃x(A)';  
(g) (∃xA)' = ∀x(A)'.  
 It is important that (X)' itself is not a formula of the language, but 
an abbreviation of the corresponding formula that is built up by (a)-
(f).  
 Now we can introduce the abstraction scheme for complex 
predicates:  
 (NA2) [x.Ax]*a = (Aa)'.  
 (NA2) makes it possible to generalize the definitions for context-
free relevance of properties:  
 Definition 7. [x.Ax] < [x.Bx] ⇔ ∀y ([x.Ax] y ∨ [x.Ax]*y → [x.Bx]y).  
Definition 8. Rel[x.Bx](π[x.Ax],a) ⇔ [x.Ax] < [x.Bx] & 
&∀y (y=a → [x.Bx] y). 
 Definition 9. Rel(π[x.Ax],a) ⇔ ∀y (y=a → [x.Ax]naty). 
8. Context-dependent relevance of properties 
Now we are approaching a very interesting topic: how a context 
can affect the relevance of properties. The main goal of Dunn's 
analysis is to rule out cases like (4) which all, according to Dunn, 
represent irrelevant predication. Using definition 1, he explicates 
(4) as "Irrelevant Predication" in the following way:  
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 (IP) (ρxP)a ⇔ ∀x (x=a → P).  
 Dunn remarks that the right-hand side of this expression corre-
sponds to a failed relevant implication (even when P is true), and 
concludes:  
An x being identical to Alcibiades has nothing to do with Socrates being 
wise (Anderson, Belnap and Dunn 1992, p. 455).  
 However, we are going to show that in some contexts this may 
be the case. Suppose, for a wile, Socrates be a pupil of Alcibiades. 
Then a sentence like "Alcibiades is such that Socrates is wise" 
appears to be not as strange, as on the face of it. Another example 
of this kind:  
 (9) The iceberg is (was) such that the ship went down in 15 
minutes.  
 Propositions (4) and (9) have essentially the same structure. It 
is clear however that the property of being such (an x) that a ship 
went down in 15 minutes can be relevant to an iceberg. But only to 
the iceberg that has collided with the ship! Thus, one may notice 
that in both cases there is some additional relation between the 
objects before and after the "such that"-expression. Just this rela-
tion makes the whole "such that"-construction relevant. We state 
that this relation can be represented by the so-called as-(or qua-) 
constructions. Indeed, suppose that Alcibiades is such that all his 
pupils are wise (i.e. we consider Alcibiades as such an x, that all 
the pupils of x are wise), and that Socrates is a pupil of Alcibiades.  
 Let us remember that Dunn explains the case with Alcibiades 
and the property of being such an x that Socrates is wise using 
(4'). He notes that (4') has the form of (PP), and states that "there 
is no way in the world with 'no funny business' that one can get A, 
using B". We are going to show, however, that under the above 
mentioned assumptions such a way can be found. Moreover we 
can stay exclusively within the conceptual framework proposed by 
Dunn. Indeed, we have:  
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(10) Alcibiades is such that all his pupils are wise. Socrates is a 
pupil of Alcibiades. Thus, Alcibiades is such that Socrates is 
wise.  
 To make the point evident we can transform (10) into the follow-
ing (Dunn-style) inference:  
(10') Alcibiades is such that all his pupils are wise. Therefore, if 
anyone is Alcibiades then all his pupils are wise. Socrates is 
a pupil of Alcibiades. That is, if anyone is Alcibiades then 
Socrates is wise.  
 Note, that we do not need the premise "Socrates is wise" to get 
to the conclusion in (10'), but do need the premise "if anyone is 
Alcibiades..."! In this case the fact that anyone is Alcibiades is 
relevant to the fact that Socrates is wise, and hence the property 
of "being such that Socrates is wise" is relevant to Alcibiades him-
self.  
 It is interesting that the analysis of (10') is made exclusively in 
spirit of Dunn's theory. We only involve some additional assump-
tion on the relations between Alcibiades and Socrates. Neverthe-
less, definition 1 does not allow to reflect this additional context.  
 The role of a context can be explicated in different ways. For the 
purposes of the present paper it is appropriate to reflect this role 
by introducing "as-expressions" (cf. the analysis of "qua-being" in 
Poli 1994). In accordance to such understanding, we get the no-
tion "the property F is relevant to a as being some x".  
 Let a\x.Ax means "a as such x that Ax". What does it mean that 
a property is relevant to an object as some x such that Ax? It 
means that aside from the information that an object should be 
equal to a, we have to take into account the additional data that 
the object is such that Ax. This motivates the following definition:  
 Definition 10. Rel(πP,a\x.Ax) ⇔ ∀y (y=a & Ay → Pnaty). 
 For complex predicates:  
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Definition 11. Rel(π[x.Ax],a\[y.By]) ⇔ ∀z (z=a & [y.By]z → 
[x.Ax]natz). 
 Consider the iceberg as such that it has collided with a ship 
(see (9)). The property of being such an x that the ship went down 
can be considered as the natural generalization of the property of 
being such an x that the ship went down in 15 minutes. Then the 
property of being such an x that the ship went down in 15 minutes 
is relevant to an iceberg iff for every object if it is the iceberg and 
has collided with the ship, the ship went down. An analogous 
analysis allows to explicate the above context where the property 
of being such that Socrates is wise is relevant to Alcibiades.  
 In the present paper we do not consider the case when a con-
text can turn a relevant property into an irrelevant one. However, a 
context can influence the relevance of properties also in this way. 
For example, in Shramko 1994 one can find some contexts in 
which "sweetness" is not a relevant property for a rose.  
9. Some facts  
Concluding the paper we establish some formal results that reflect 
important features of the introduced notion of relevance of proper-
ties. We will deal with simple properties, having in mind that all the 
proofs can be easily extended to complex predicates.  
 First we clarify the relations between Dunn's notion of relevant 
predication (which we call the non-fictional predication) and our 
notion of relevance of properties.  
 Fact 1. If an object non-fictionally (in the sense of definition 1) 
has a property, than the property is relevant to the object.  
 Proof.  
 1. ∀x (x=a → Px)      (definition 1)  
 2. ∀x (Px ∨ P'x → Pnatx)  (definition 3)  
 3. Px → Pnatx       (2, ∀-elimination, propositional 
logic)  
 4. ∀x (x=a → Pnatx)     (1, 3, ∀-el., transitivity, ∀-int.) 
 THEORIA - Segunda Época 81 
 Vol. 14/1, 1999, 63-81 
Yaroslav SHRAMKO A THEORY OF RELEVANT PROPERTIES 1 
 Let us say that the property is non-fictionally determinate with 
respect to a iff ∀x (x=a → Px ∨ P'x). Then we can generalize the 
fact 1 in the following way: 
 Fact 2. If a property is non-fictionally determinate with respect to 
a, then it is relevant to it.  
 Proof.  
 1. ∀x (x=a → Px v P'x)    (P is non-fictionally determinate 
wrt a)  
 2. ∀x (Px ∨ P'x → Pnatx)  (definition 3)  
 3. ∀x (x=a → Pnatx)     (1, 2, ∀-el., transitivity, ∀-int.) 
 Finally we show that the property of being self-identical cannot 
create a context that may influence relevance of any other prop-
erty.  
 Fact 3. If a property is relevant to an object as being such that it 
is self-identical, then the property is simply relevant to an object.  
 Proof.  
 1. ∀x (x=a & x=x → Pnatx)  (P is relevant to a as such an x that 
x=x)  
 2. x=x         (reflexivity of identity)  
 3. ∀x (x=a → Pnatx)     (1, 2, ∀-el., propositional logic, ∀-
int.) 
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